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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02206-87/1
21 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Frederick L. Wetters *[Signature]*
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 19 May 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

Frederick L. Wetters
Frederick L. Wetters *[Signature]*

Attachment:
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19 May 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Intelligence Community Representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 19 May.

1. Angola Update: DIA led the discussion which resulted in consensus on the following points:

- Major FAPLA (MPLA armed forces) buildups continue at Cuito Cuanavale and strong forces are being supplied at the Lucusse front. UNITA has begun a series of relatively large ambushes of two multi-brigade sized FAPLA resupply convoys [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Should UNITA continue to devastate these two convoys, it will set back the timetable for any FAPLA operations from Cuito Cuanavale.

- Current evidence leads to two alternate interpretations or scenarios--a serious attack scenario, with major FAPLA attacks to be mounted from both Cuito Cuanavale and Lucusse; or the defensive FAPLA scenario, wherein FAPLA only cautiously makes minor improvements while improving air defenses and runways of these forward positions. The Representatives agreed that thus far the intelligence did not favor either interpretation.
- FAPLA's third axis of advance, from Munhongo, is quiet and does not seem to play a major part in forthcoming operations.
- While UNITA has made some moderate impact in conducting new operations in Uige Province and elsewhere in the north, they are not yet of a scale that would draw FAPLA forces away from the southeast sector. [REDACTED]

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The NIO advanced his view that South African forces might be preparing an intervention strike into southern Angola, perhaps to support UNITA operations around Cuito Cuanavale. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] There was no support among the Representatives for predicting an imminent South African intervention, with the Reps holding to the view--written in the recent SNIE--that any South African intervention would be situational, probably in response to a FAPLA advance on Mavinga. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

2. Chad Update: DIA again led the discussion. Consensus was established on the following points:

- The Libyan leadership appears committed to holding on to the Aozou area. Some reinforcement of Libyan forces at this point has occurred, with total Libyan forces in the area numbering about 3,500. Habre's FANT forces have about 6,000 troops capable of operating in the area. These have not been fully amassed for attack yet due to FANT logistical problems and problems with mines. Some FANT troops are infiltrating into the Aozou area.
- Franco-Chadian relations have recovered somewhat from a recent low point but there is still mutual suspicion and animosity.
- FANT appears capable and determined to attack and drive the Libyans out of their last stronghold in Chad. The most likely procedure would be to attack Aozou town and then ambush any Libyan reinforcements that might be sent from their stronghold at Aozou airfield several kilometers away. [REDACTED]

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WARNING NOTE: A FANT attack on Libyan positions in the Aozou area appears likely within the next 30 days despite French and other external efforts to dissuade Habre from this. FANT forces stand a reasonably good chance of success. [REDACTED]

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WARNING NOTE: The Habre government's national day gala scheduled for 7 June at Faya Largeau--at which there will be considerable foreign representation--offers an inviting target for a Libyan-sponsored terrorist attack or a Libyan air raid. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

3. The Zambia Situation: NIO/AF noted the recent decision by the Zambian government to abandon the Western-sponsored economic reform plan centered around specific IMF strictures. He posed the question about its impact on Zambian economics and politics and regional implications. State/INR led the discussion of this matter and consensus formed around the following points:

- In the very short term, President Kaunda's decision is likely to be popular with the masses. Fixed prices and new spending will temporarily halt the slide in the standard of living.

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- The one exception to a benign immediate impact revolves around the
Zambian decision to limit debt service to 10 percent of hard
currency earnings. If Zambia sticks to this, it will lose a \$400
million World Bank disbursement, which would create some immediate
problems. It appears likely that Zambia will negotiate with donors,
including the Bank, and back off of this decision. The donors are
likely to proceed cautiously and at most suspend loans and aid
disbursements rather than cancel them.
- Severe negative effects of the Zambian decision will manifest
themselves in a couple of months. There will be a severe foreign
exchange crunch, serious shortages will appear, the black market and
smuggling will become rampant, and the street value of the Zambian
currency will depreciate rapidly against Western currency. Sporadic
strikes will begin.
- President Kaunda appears to be heeding a coterie of leftist economic
advisers rather than the pragmatists who surrounded him in the last
two years. Thus the return to state controls over the economy will
likely deepen.
- President Kaunda [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] sees the opposition of the Zambian 25X1
business class as subversive and has already cracked down on unions
and alleged dissidents. As economic-based grumbling increases, he
will likely instigate new crackdowns and move Zambia closer to a
police state.
- [redacted] reported [redacted] arms deal with the Soviets seems 25X1
plausible given Kaunda's security concerns, both domestic and South
African plotting. Scarce resources will be allocated to security
forces, both to defend the regime and mollify the forces
themselves. [redacted] 25X1

WARNING NOTE: Zambian willingness to back off of the 10 percent limit
on debt service is critical to contain short-term negative economic
consequences. Kaunda's security concerns will drive him to increasingly
repressive moves against critics and perceived dissidents. [redacted] 25X1

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4. South African Update: NIO/AF led a brief self-criticism session on
predicting the election results. He noted that no one had called it really
well, and the closest estimate he saw was contained in the recent SNIE on
South Africa. The NIO opined that insufficient attention was paid to why
P. W. Botha was playing so hard to the white right; P.W. in fact recognized
the gravity of the threat. One analyst suggested that the National Party,

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being perceived as reformist but concerned with security, successfully coopted a large bulk of the Anglophone voters, and the PFP's lack of a security policy combined with white apprehension drove Anglophones into the NP. There was some sentiment that some of the reporting on the alleged strength of liberals and moderates during the campaign may have reflected wishful thinking. [REDACTED]

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The following points were agreed to in an examination of the short-term implications of the election:

- On the succession issue, both leading candidates Heunis and de Klerk were badly bruised by the election. It is too early to tell who was helped, but an examination of alternate candidates must increase.
- Reform/repression: Botha will likely reiterate reforms hinted at in the last year--a National Statutory Council for blacks, some fiddling with the Group Areas Act. Given the strengthening of the right, most reforms will be put off until next year. The major theme of the government will be a continuation and heightening of repression of opposition, with new crackdowns on extraparliamentary groups and overseas funding of such groups. There will be new actions against militants in the COSATU labor federation, but the government will not ban it outright and will move cautiously with the mineworkers' union.
- On cross-border activities, the imperative for highly visible cross-border actions has probably dwindled, but the SAG will certainly continue [REDACTED] actions against ANC offices and personnel in neighboring states. Zimbabwe seems to top the list of states that are likely targets of security forces actions against the ANC presence. Given SAG loss of support in northern Transvaal, some reprisals for new ANC actions can be expected.
- On Namibia, the SAG is now likely to be even less receptive to pressures for reforms in Namibia, either from abroad or from Namibian political groups. The SAG will probably not repudiate UNSCR 435 but may well dissolve the Transitional Government at some point. It will almost certainly allow the Constitutional Council to expire this month. The SAG will explore the prospects for ethnic elections and attempt to coopt Ovambo leader Kalangula. [REDACTED]

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In addition to the above points of consensus, there was spirited debate on the implications of the election insofar as it relates to the relationship and future prospects of the NP in regard to the Conservative Party, but there was no consensus achieved. [REDACTED]

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WARNING NOTE: We expect a crackdown on extraparliamentary opposition groups, including those funded by the US Government, and we envision the SAG taking measures to limit or end such external funding of groups which annoy it.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

Office of the Vice President
DIA/DIO/Africa
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8
DIA/JSI-5B
DIA/OA-6
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/LDA
DDI/EURA
DDI/OIA
NPIC
FBIS
DDO/AF
ICS/OHC

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